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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, Case No. 920492-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Priority No. 2 
-vs-
MARK EDWARD McGRATH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules and/or constitutional provisions 
are determinative or may be determinative of the outcome of this 
appeal: U.C.A. § 77-29-1, (1980, as amended). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED MR. 
McGRATH'S RIGHT TO A TRIAL WITHIN 
120 DAYS PURSUANT TO §77-29-1. 
As pointed out in defendant's opening brief, an individual in 
Utah who is incarcerated is entitled to be brought to trial within 
120 days of his request for a disposition of the charges against 
him. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1953 as amended). 
The State responds in its brief that the trial court did not 
err in failing to bring defendant to trial earlier. The State 
relies upon two theories: that defendant's request for disposition 
was "premature" and that he failed adequately to specify the 
charges pending against him or the court in which the charges were 
pending. 
It is true that the defendant filed his request for a 
disposition pursuant to §77-29-1 in March of 1991, and that the 
Information was not filed below until August 1991, some five months 
later. However, there is nothing in the statute, nor anything in 
Utah case law, which would indicate that the filing of the 
information does not trigger the effects of the earlier request for 
disposition, and result in a requirement that the defendant be 
brought to trial within 120 days. 
As of August 1991, a formal Information had been filed by 
defendant. A demand for disposition of the charges which were the 
subject of the information had been filed. 
At his arraignment before the District Court Judge on January 
10, 1992, the defendant told the judge that he had filed the 
request for disposition, and that he intended to invoke the 120 day 
time limit. Assuming, arguendo, that the State's position is true, 
that the request for disposition was not effective when it was 
filed, assuming that it did not become effective at the time the 
information was filed in August, it certainly became effective on 
January 10, 1992, when he stated to the court, to the prosecution, 
and to everyone on the open record that he intended to invoke a 120 
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day time limit. Even if the time limit did not begin to run until 
January 10, 1992, the trial court still violated the requirements 
of the statute. This invocation of the requirement for a 
disposition would have required that defendant be brought to trial 
by no later than May 10, 1992. His trial did not occur until June. 
This Court should interpret §77-29-1 as allowing for a re-
invocation of a prior written demand for speedy disposition, if the 
demand is inadvertently filed before a formal Information is filed. 
This court should find that the defendant's trial should have 
commenced, if at all, by no later than May 10, 1992. 
POINT II. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUF^ IN 
THE DEFENDANTS CONVICTION OF TP*1 xME 
OF THEFT BY RECEIVING AS A MATTEL or JM. 
A. The defendant has properly briefed this issue 
to the trial court. 
Defendant acknowledges his obligation to marshall the evidence 
in favor of the verdict, and to demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient. Defendant has done so, and will continue to do so, 
in his briefs. 
In his opening brief, defendant pointed out in the Statement 
of Facts, that the incriminating evidence against defendant (with 
citation to the record) was substantially as follows: 
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a. that defendant had gone with Linda Steadman and with 
Mr. Corey Brooks to a store on January 22, 1991, in a red 
pickup truck, that the defendant drove, and that the defendant 
gave Ms. Steadman $300.00 to buy a pistol at the store, (Tr. 
June 1, 1992, pp.137-141); and 
b. that Corey Brooks went to the Vert home on January 
28, 1991, to look at a diamond ring, and that he was carrying 
a hand-held CB radio. This same man returned to the Vert home 
on the morning of January 29, 1991, with the same radio, 
pointed an automatic pistol at Stephanie Vert, handcuffed her 
to the pipes in her basement bathroom, went through the house 
taking all the jewelry, and spoke on the radio to some other 
person shortly before leaving the home, (Tr. June 1, 1992, 
pp.64-66); and 
c. That a Bill Anderson observed the pickup truck 
parked a couple of blocks away from the Vert residence on 
January 28, 1991. He observed a man matching the description 
of Corey Brooks get out of the pickup, walk to the Vert 
residence, and enter the Vert home. This was the same evening 
that Stephanie Vert had been talking to Mr. Brooks about the 
purchase of her diamond ring (Tr. June 1, 1992, pp.115-116). 
The witness, Mr. Anderson, thought that a female person 
remained in the vehicle while Mr. Brooks went into the Vert 
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home. Mr. Anderson was unsure of the color of the pickup 
truck, (R.O.A. 490); and 
d. the witnesses, Kim Fisher and Rodney Langenbacker, 
identified Mark McGrath as the person who was driving Corey 
Brooks around in a red pickup truck on January 29, 1991, the 
day of the robbery. They testified that defendant and Corey 
Brooks stopped at their home where Corey Brooks showed the 
witnesses some jewelry out of his attache case. It was later 
established at trial that some of the items in the attache 
case matched a list made by Ms. Martha Vert of jewelry taken 
from her home. In particular, there was a marquis cut diamond 
ring. Mr. Langenbacker testified that Mr. Brooks admitted 
having committed the robbery, when a news account of the 
robbery was broadcast on television during their visit. Corey 
Brooks gave the witnesses a costume jewelry chain when Rodney 
Langenbacker told him that the chain was not made of real 
gold. Martha Vert later identified the chain as part of the 
jewelry that had been stolen from her home, (Tr. June 1, 1992, 
pp.73-77); and 
e. Mr. McGrath was not involved in any discussions 
about theft or sale of the jewelry with Kim Fisher or Rodney 
Langenbacker, (Tr. June 1, 1992, pp.75, 11.16-24 and pp.90-
91) . 
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This is a summary of all the testimony against the defendant 
at trial, and constitutes an adequate marshalling of the evidence 
against the defendant. The State, in its own brief, cannot cite 
any further evidence, that the defendant was guilty of the crime 
charged. 
This certainly constitutes an adequate marshalling of the 
evidence against defendant, to satisfy the requirements of Utah 
appellate procedure. 
B. On the merits, the State failed to prove the 
charges against defendant as a matter of law. 
When the foregoing evidence is analyzed, it is clear that the 
prosecution failed to establish the elements of second degree 
felony theft by receiving as a matter of law. 
The elements of theft by receiving, are as follows: 
1. that defendant received, retained or disposed of 
another's property; 
2. knowing or believing that the property had been 
stolen; 
3. with the intent to deprive the owner thereof; and 
4. that the property was valued at over $1,000.00. 
Assuming all of the evidence as cited by the prosecution at 
trial and by the State in its brief, it is still insufficient to 
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meet these four elements. That Mr. McGrath purchased a pistol on 
January 22, 1991, is not evidence that he intended to have anything 
to do with the robbery of the Vert home one week later, or with 
receiving stolen property taken in that robbery after the fact. In 
fact, the defendant's purchasing of a weapon one-week prior to the 
robbery, (even if he did so with the intent to give it to Corey 
Brooks, or even if he did so and then permitted it to fall into the 
hands of Corey Brooks) has nothing to do with receiving stolen 
property. Defendant's purchase of the weapon, even if the State's 
version is to be believed, is wholly irrelevant to the crime 
charged and should not even have been permitted into evidence at 
trial. Had defendant had effective assistance of counsel, the 
introduction of any evidence pertaining to purchase of the weapon 
would have been excluded at trial on a defense motion. 
The fact that the prosecution continues to cite the 
defendant's purchase of a weapon as having anything to do with the 
elements of the crime charged supports the defendant's claim. The 
prosecution is attempting to prove that the defendant aided and 
abetted the robbery, by obtaining the robbery weapon ahead of time 
and giving it to the robber. The prosecution is then attempting to 
bootstrap this evidence of aiding and abetting a robbery into a 
conviction for receiving stolen property. 
The second item of evidence upon which the State relies to 
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support the conviction is that Mr. McGrath drove the robber, Mr. 
Brooks, during his efforts to sell the jewelry. As noted in the 
citation to the record above, the witnesses who verify that Mr. 
McGrath was driving Mr. Brooks on January 29, 1991, say that he 
(the defendant) was not involved in any discussions about the theft 
or sale of the jewelry. He was simply present with Mr. Brooks. 
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not a criminal act. 
Association with people who are intending to commit a crime or who 
have committed a crime is not in and of itself a criminal act. 
Defendant's association with and physical proximity to Corey Brooks 
on January 29, 1991, does not mean that he was involved in any 
crime being perpetrated by Mr. Brooks on that occasion. All that 
the State's evidence can prove is that defendant was present at the 
scene while Mr. Brooks committed the crime of attempting to sell 
stolen property. 
Crucially, none of the evidence adduced at trial and nothing 
cited in the State's brief can verify that defendant here knew the 
jewelry in Mr. Brooks attache case was stolen. Absolutely nothing 
places the jewelry in the physical possession of the defendant at 
any point in time. Absolutely nothing places any of the proceeds 
of the sale of the jewelry in the possession of the defendant at 
any time. 
The State cannot prove that the defendant received or retained 
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or disposed of property belonging to the Verts. The State cannot 
prove that the defendant knew that the property in the possession 
of Mr. Brooks was stolen property. 
The State cannot prove that the defendant ever intended to 
possess stolen property or ever received any value for stolen 
property. 
Hence, even though Mr. McGrath was not seen or identified as 
being at the Vert house on January 28 or 29, 1991, the two 
occasions when Corey Brooks entered the Vert home, the prosecution 
was permitted to argue the irrelevant point that he was present 
during all other "significant incidents in preparation for the 
robbery and after the robbery for the sale of the jewelry." There 
is no evidence putting the jewelry in the possession of Mark 
McGrath, nor proceeds from the jewelry in the possession of Mark 
McGrath, nor knowledge of the fact that the jewelry had been stolen 
into the mind of Mark McGrath. The prosecution nonetheless 
obtained a conviction for receiving stolen property. 
The verdict must fail as a matter of law, and the defendant is 
entitled to a judgment of acquittal. 
POINT III. DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR 
TRIAL WAS PREJUDICED BY EXTENSIVE AND 
PERVASIVE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, WHICH 
HE HAS ESTABLISHED ON A BASIS OF "PLAIN 
ERROR." 
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Defendant cited in his opening brief numerous statutory 
obligations, case law obligations and ethical obligations imposed 
upon a prosecutor in a criminal case. The State makes light of 
these obligations, brushing them off as "broadly-cast. . . case 
laws and rules about prosecutors' ethical responsibilities." 
(State's brief at p.20). These broadly-cast laws and rules are in 
fact the constitutional provisions and ethical requirements which 
prevent a much better financed, better equipped and better 
organized governmental agency from running rough-shod over the 
rights of an individual. The State does not deny, in principal, 
that these ethical obligations exist. 
The State also does not deny that a prosecutor (or any lawyer) 
has an ethical obligation not to introduce in trial any evidence 
which he does not reasonably believe is relevant. Defendant argued 
in his opening brief that the prosecutor committed misconduct, at 
a level of plain error, by using inadmissible evidence to convict 
him. This evidence is as follows: 
a. the prosecution introduced evidence that Mr. McGrath 
had bought a gun eight days before he was alleged to be in 
intentional possession of stolen property. The gun had 
absolutely nothing to do with the offense charged. The 
prosecution nevertheless plowed ahead with introducing 
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evidence of the gun, despite the fact that it was not 
reasonably relevant; and 
b. the prosecution adduced at trial all of the gory 
details regarding the Vert robbery. They had a young and 
sympathetic woman describe being victimized in a horrible 
crime, being held at gunpoint and handcuffed to pipes in her 
basement. Again, this had absolutely nothing to do with Mr. 
McGrath. He was never placed at the scene in any manner. The 
actions of Mr. Brooks in terrorizing the Vert family have 
nothing to do with Mr. McGrath7s alleged conduct in receiving 
stolen property. It was wholly irrelevant. Nonetheless, the 
prosecution again plowed ahead to make repeated references to 
the robbery. 
Most importantly, the State does not deny in its brief that 
the standard to be used in assessing the improper statements of the 
prosecution is one of reasonable doubt. Since the prosecutor 
cannot prove his comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the defendant is entitled to a new trial. (State v. Terafa, 720 
P.2d 1368 (Ut. 1986). 
This conduct constituted plain error, for which the 
defendant's conviction should be reversed. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE A 
MISTRIAL. 
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It is apparently undisputed, on the status of the briefing, 
that evidence which was not admitted at trial nonetheless made its 
way into the jury room during the jury deliberations. 
It was certainly error for the court to permit extraneous 
material into the jury room during deliberation. The only question 
remaining is whether the court abused its discretion in denying the 
defendant's mistrial motion. 
The State relies upon the trial court's cautionary instruction 
that the document was to be used for impeachment purposes only, in 
curing this error. This appellate court must keep in mind the 
context in which the transcripts were coming in. The witness, Ms. 
Steadman, was permitted to testify as to the wholly irrelevant fact 
that Mr. McGrath had participated in purchasing a weapon over one 
week before the Vert robbery. Ms. Steadman gave one statement to 
police, and testified differently at trial. The tapes and 
transcripts were introduced by the prosecution to impeach her, to 
demonstrate that she had changed her testimony at trial to be more 
favorable to the defendant. It is highly likely that all of this 
confused the jury deliberation process in any event, since Ms. 
Steadman7s testimony had nothing to do with the crime for which 
defendant was charged in the first place. The jury was nonetheless 
permitted to hear her testimony and to hear the tape recording of 
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her prior statement, and to review the transcript of her prior 
statement, all of which was plain error in the first place. The 
jury was then further confused on the issue by having their 
transcripts confiscated in the middle of their deliberations. They 
were given an instruction which must be confusing to a layman 
(since so few who are law trained apparently understand the 
distinction) that Ms. Steadman's tapes were to be used only for 
impeaching her testimony and not for any substantive purpose. 
By this time, the whole issue of the irrelevant testimony, the 
inadmissible tapes, and the "correcting" instruction would have so 
hopelessly confused the jury in their deliberation on the real 
issue (whether defendant had received stolen property) that it must 
constitute an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have 
denied the mistrial. 
POINT V. DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE BY TRIAL COUNSEL. 
It is apparent, after a review of the briefing to date, that 
the parties to this appeal agree regarding the two-element standard 
used to assess a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Defendant must prove that counsel's performance was 
objectively deficient, and that prejudice resulted from the 
deficiency. It is also undisputed that an appellant typically 
cannot raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claimed for the 
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first time on appeal, but that he may do so if the record is 
adequate, in order to permit determination of issues by the 
appellate court and where there is new counsel on appeal. This is 
the circumstance in the case now before the court. 
The first claimed error by the defendant is the failure of his 
counsel to permit him to testify at trial. The State takes 
exception with the manner in which defendant raises this issue. 
The State claims that this allegation is unsupported by the trial 
record, and is raised only in an ex-parte affidavit, which is an 
addendum to defendant's brief on appeal. 
If this Court supports, as a wholesale proposition, that a 
defendant may never raise claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in this manner, then the court makes it impossible for 
defendant to raise this issue as a practical matter either in the 
trial court or on appeal. It is highly unlikely that a trial 
attorney, having rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in the 
first instance, will then admit to this error (subjecting himself 
to malpractice liability) to present the issue at the trial court 
level. Since trial courts generally require that those who are 
represented by counsel go through counsel in presenting arguments 
to the court, there is no effective manner in which a defendant 
who believes he is being misrepresented by counsel can get the 
issue to the attention of the trial court. 
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The next stage at which a defendant might reasonably have 
review of the problem is upon appeal, with new counsel appointed 
because he has finally been able to complain to the trial court or 
the appellate court about the effectiveness of his predecessor 
counsel. This makes the record at the trial court inadequate, in 
part because of the very ineffectiveness which the defendant 
complains about in the first place. Unless the defendant is 
permitted to address to the court the issues which bother him in 
the form of an affidavit, the issue will effectively escape 
appellate review. 
The defendant's affidavit should not be stricken from the 
record. Either on the basis of the record the court should grant 
defendant's appeal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In the alternative, if the affidavit itself and the allegations in 
the affidavit cause the court any concern, then the matter should 
be remanded to the trial court pursuant to motion, to take further 
evidence now that Mr. McGrath has counsel who will pursue this 
issue. This would grant the trial court the opportunity to 
determine the allegations raised in the affidavit, and would permit 
the State an opportunity meet the issue. 
Defendant further asserts that his trial counsel was 
deficient, in the manner in which the trial itself was conducted. 
As noted above, the State was permitted, without objection 
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from defense counsel and without action by the court, to present 
extremely prejudicial testimony which was wholly irrelevant to 
defendant's prosecution, including that he had purchased a weapon 
a week before a robbery which had no relevance to the crime charged 
against him, and that another party who had been in the company of 
the defendant had committed the robbery. To fail to object to this 
evidence was clearly a deficient performance on the part of defense 
counsel, especially since counsel could have done so in a motion 
outside the presence of the jury, without impacting the opinion of 
the jury at all on these issues. 
Finally, there is more than a "reasonable probability" that, 
but for counsel's errors, the result at the trial level would have 
been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and 
State v. Frame, 723 P. 2d 401 (Ut., 1986). The State essentially 
concedes this argument in its appeal brief. At page 23 of the 
brief, the State admits: "There is merit to McGrath's contention 
that the now-challenged evidence [regarding the gun purchased and 
the robbery] harmed his defense. This was a rather close case; the 
jury required eight hours to reach its verdict. (R.236). Without 
the now-challenged evidence, the State might not have prevailed at 
trial." 
Evidence regarding the gun purchase and the details of the 
robbery were clearly irrelevant to the crime of receiving stolen 
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property. They were also inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Had counsel simply objected, there is a high 
likelihood that the trial court would have sustained the objection. 
There is also a high likelihood that, had the trial court denied 
the objection, this Court would have found that to be reversible 
error. Defendant's counsel did not object, and permitted vast 
quantities of irrelevant material of a highly prejudicial nature to 
come before the jury. 
Because defendant can establish both prongs of the test 
necessary to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and 
because he can establish, by the State's own admission, that this 
ineffective assistance of counsel had an impact on the outcome of 
his case, he is entitled to a new trial. 
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING 
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED THREAT 
AGAINST THE STATE'S WITNESS. 
The defendant objected at trial to the testimony of the 
witness, Ms. Steadman, to the effect that the defendant had 
threatened her prior to the trial. The evidence came in. 
The State, in its brief, argues that the threat in question 
was relevant to prove the element of the offense charged that 
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defendant had knowingly participated with Corey Brooks in 
possessing or disposing of the jewelry stolen in the Vert robbery. 
The State claims that, by threatening the witness, defendant 
demonstrated awareness that the jewelry was stolen. This is not 
the case. 
It is uncontroverted that the defendant was on parole for an 
earlier offense at the time of the Vert robbery. Certainly, he was 
aware at the time of the robbery that any hint of his involvement 
in any criminal activity, or any indication that he had been 
involved in the purchase of a weapon, or any indication that he was 
consorting with known felons might violate his parole. He may have 
threatened the witness to keep quiet about the purchase of the gun, 
or his friendship with Corey Brooks, solely out of fear of having 
his parole violated, and not for any purpose having anything to do 
with the crime of receiving stolen property. 
In fact, Ms. Steadman was the witness who could not do 
anything to place defendant at the scene of the robbery or in 
possession of stolen jewelry. All she could do was put him in the 
presence of a gun similar to the one used in the robbery. 
Under all of these circumstances, the evidence of the threat 
was irrelevant, even to prove the element of mens rea, as alleged 
by the State. The court committed reversible error in permitting 
this evidence to go before the jury. 
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POINT VII. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN INCORRECTLY CHARGING THE JURY. 
It is undisputed, that the jury was instructed, they were 
instructed that the defendant was charged with being "armed with a 
dangerous weapon, to wit: a gun, . . . " at the time of the 
offense. (This court should consider, in relation to the effective 
assistance of counsel argument, why defendant's trial counsel did 
not object to this reading of an incorrect Information to the 
jury.) 
Later, in instructing the jury as to the specific elements of 
the offense, the court did not mention the question of a weapon. 
The prosecution itself did not object to this incorrect 
Information being read to the jury, either. Further, the 
prosecution continued, throughout the trial, to introduce improper 
evidence to the jury, in the form of evidence that the defendant 
had bought a gun and been in the presence of someone who had 
performed a robbery with a gun. 
It is not surprising that, in mid-deliberation, the jury 
indicated it was confused. At this point in time, the following 
had happened to the jury: 
a. they had been incorrectly instructed about the 
nature of the charges against the defendant; and 
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b. they had heard copious amounts of evidence about the 
defendant having a gun, about defendant allegedly threatening 
a witness and a robbery; and 
c. the jury had one batch of evidence (the transcript 
of the tape-recorded telephone conversation with Ms. Steadman) 
admitted into the jury room and then confiscated; and 
d. the jury then encountered an instruction which had 
a material difference from the Information which they had been 
told had been charged against the defendant. 
Under all of these circumstances, one would expect the jury to 
be hopelessly confused. At this point, no length or manner of 
instructing could correct all of the problems. The verdict was 
defective. Defendant was deprived of his right to due process. 
With all this multiplicity of errors, the court must assume 
prejudice and find that the trial court committed plain error in 
instructing the jury in this manner. 
Moreover, the "corrective" instruction to the jury regarding 
the inaccurate Information might alert a sophisticated juror to the 
fact that the defendant had been previously charged with aiding and 
abetting the robbery, that the documents had been amended to 
include the less serious offense upon which the defendant was 
bound-over, but that the documents had not been corrected on the 
word processor used to print the amended Information. This might 
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then give rise in the mind of a sophisticated juror to begin 
speculating to other jurors about what kind of evidence the State 
had to cause them to believe that the defendant was involved in the 
robbery. 
The State in its brief asserts that this error is "ironically" 
the type of error which, if uncorrected, could have aided Mr. 
McGrath. This might be true, had the prosecution not previously 
and in violation of its ethical obligations introduced substantial 
irrelevant evidence connecting defendant to a gun and an armed 
robbery. It is a greater leap of faith to assume that this error 
assisted the defendant, than to assume that it was prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant is entitled to the 
following relief, in the alternative: 
1. the Court should dismiss the charges against the 
defendant pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §77-29-1 (1953 as 
amended); or 
2. the Court should grant the defendant a judgment of 
acquittal, because the State failed to sustain its burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law; or 
3. the defendant should have his conviction set aside 
and the matter remanded for a new trial, based upon 
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ineffective assistance of counsel, and the numerous errors 
committed in the trial court as set forth above; or 
4. the defendant is entitled to have the issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel remanded to the trial court, 
upon motion, to here and make finding upon the question of 
whether the defendant was improperly prohibited from 
testifying at trial by his former counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 1994. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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